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Introduction
Over the past four to five years, the focus in casemix-based
payment systems in the United States has shifted more
and more towards "value-based-purchasing" and "pay-
for-performance" measures. The reporting of pre-set qual-
ity indicators is now fundamentally in place for both the
inpatient prospective-payment system, based on Medi-
care-Severity Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRGs), and,
more recently, the outpatient prospective-payment sys-
tem, based on Ambulatory Payment Classifications
(APCs).
For hospitals to receive their full casemix MS-DRG or APC
payment, whether for inpatient services or outpatient
services, all required quality indicators must be reported.
Reporting pre-determined quality indicators is important
for data collection and monitoring, but the simple act of
reporting data does not, and should not, be used as a
proxy to talk about the delivery of "high-quality" health-
care services. In fact, critics in the U.S. consider the current
"pay-for-performance" system simply a "pay-for-report-
ing" system which does little to measure true quality, or
the lack of it.
Additional quality-of-care concepts have been introduced
more recently. These focus on the reporting of specific
diagnoses that may influence final DRG assignment and,
thus, final payment in the inpatient setting. These con-
cepts focus on whether reported diagnoses were "Present
on Admission" (POA), or whether they were "Hospital
Acquired Conditions" (HACs) that surfaced during the
patient's hospitalization.
Examining such data begins to tell a different story about
the patient's disease state upon arrival to the hospital ver-
sus conditions, often considered preventable, that might
have occurred during the stay. The practice of flagging
diagnoses that are POA, versus those that are HACs, is one
method the U.S. Medicare program uses to provide an
incentive to hospitals to offer high-quality treatment
while a patient is in their care.
If certain preventable conditions, including Never Events,
occur during the patient's stay, then Medicare believes
that these secondary diagnoses should not influence
grouping, nor the final MS-DRG payment calculation.
This link between the reporting of specific data, the
assumption made about the quality-of-care rendered, and
the final impact on payment is quite new, and to some
extent controversial. It will be reviewed during this ses-
sion.
Methods
This session will provide a review of the required inpatient
and outpatient quality indicators that hospitals, under the
Medicare program, must report in order to receive their
full casemix payment. In addition, it will cover current
requirements related to flagging certain diagnoses as POA,
versus those that are considered HACs, and Never Events,
as defined by Medicare. Finally, this session will provide a
preview of Medicare's future plans related to measuring
quality and typing it to payment.
Results
Much of the discussion focusing on quality and casemix
has centered on reducing payments, rather than offering
incentives, or extra payment, for hospitals that are truly
innovative in their approach to offering high levels of
patient safety, quality and access. Creating incentives that
promote the delivery of high-quality healthcare is differ-
ent from implementing mechanisms that withhold pay-
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ment from hospitals deemed to provide "poor-quality"
care.
Understanding this nuance is critical to creating the
"right" set of incentives for both efficiency and quality.
Whether this can be done effectively by reducing, or with-
holding, casemix payment to hospitals that fail to report
quality indicators, or that fail to provide quality health-
care (as defined by the list of HACs and Never Events),
remains to be seen.
Conclusion
Measuring quality-of-care has always been difficult, and
the fact that there is no one "right" answer complicates the
discussion. Many studies have shown that neither higher
costs, nor greater spending, nor higher utilization is a
guarantee for high quality-of-care. In many cases, quite
the opposite has been found. Therefore, a discussion
about quality-of-care can begin with the reporting of cer-
tain data elements, and through the creation of certain
incentives and disincentives related to payment.
But this is only the beginning of the quality, cost and pay-
ment debate, and we still have a long way to go. The use
of quality concepts, insofar as they influence hospital pay-
ments, is still relatively new and somewhat controversial.
However, it is in place in the United States.
Creating efficiency incentives for hospitals through the
use of casemix-based payment systems must be carefully
balanced along with ensuring patient access and safety,
and providing high-quality healthcare services. This ses-
sion aims to provide attendees with information about
the U.S. experience, and the conclusions that can be
drawn from it at present.Page 2 of 2
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